Radioxenon detections in the CTBT international monitoring system likely related to the announced nuclear test in North Korea on February 12, 2013  by Ringbom, A. et al.
lable at ScienceDirect
Journal of Environmental Radioactivity 128 (2014) 47e63Contents lists avaiJournal of Environmental Radioactivity
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/ jenvradRadioxenon detections in the CTBT international monitoring system
likely related to the announced nuclear test in North Korea on
February 12, 2013
A. Ringbom a,*, A. Axelsson a, M. Aldener a, M. Auer b, T.W. Bowyer c, T. Fritioff a,
I. Hoffman d, K. Khrustalev b, M. Nikkinen b, V. Popov e, Y. Popov e, K. Ungar d, G. Wotawa f
a Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), Gulfossgatan 12, SE-164 90 Stockholm, Sweden
b Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Provisional Technical Secretariat, P.O. Box 1200, A-1400 Vienna,
Austria
c Paciﬁc Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), P.O. Box 999, Richland, WA 99352, USA
dRadiation Protection Bureau, Health Canada, 755 Brookﬁeld Rd., A.L. 6302D1, Ottawa, ON K1A 1C1, Canada
e Lares Ltd, Russia
fCentral Institute for Meteorology and Geodynamics (ZAMG), A-1190 Vienna, Austriaa r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 17 August 2013
Received in revised form
29 October 2013
Accepted 31 October 2013
Available online 30 November 2013
Keywords:
North Korea nuclear test
CTBT
IMS
Radioxenon* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: anders.ringbom@foi.se (A. Ringbo
0265-931X  2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevie
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvrad.2013.10.027a b s t r a c t
Observations made in April 2013 of the radioxenon isotopes 133Xe and 131mXe at measurement stations in
Japan and Russia, belonging to the International Monitoring System for veriﬁcation of the Comprehen-
sive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, are unique with respect to the measurement history of these stations.
Comparison of measured data with calculated isotopic ratios as well as analysis using atmospheric
transport modeling indicate that it is likely that the xenon measured was created in the underground
nuclear test conducted by North Korea on February 12, 2013, and released 7e8 weeks later. More than
one release is required to explain all observations. The 131mXe source terms for each release were
calculated to 0.7 TBq, corresponding to about 1e10% of the total xenon inventory for a 10 kt explosion,
depending on fractionation and release scenario. The observed ratios could not be used to obtain any
information regarding the ﬁssile material that was used in the test.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
At 02:58 UTC, on February 12, 2013, the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) conducted its third announced nuclear
test, following the ﬁrst on October 9, 2006, and the second on May
25, 2009. As the previous two, the testwas carried out in theMantap
Mountain at the Pungye-ri nuclear test site. All three tests were
detected and located by seismic stations belonging to the Interna-
tional Monitoring System (IMS) used to verify the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-BanTreaty (CTBT). Based on seismic data, the third test
appears to have been the most powerful of the three (CTBTO, 2013;
USGS, 2013), with an estimated explosive yield in the approximate
range of 10 kt (NORSAR, 2013). The yield of the test in 2006 is usuallym).
r Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-estimated as less than1kt,while the second test in 2009was about a
factor of 4 more powerful (Murphy et al., 2011; Hui, 2007).
The InternationalMonitoring System (IMS), which is being set up
for veriﬁcation of the CTBT, is nearly completed. About 300 of the
planned 321 globally distributed seismic-, hydroacoustic-, infra-
sound- and radionuclide stations are now installed. The radionuclide
part of IMS will consist of 80 radionuclide particulate stations (63
installed so far), of which at least 40 (30 installed) will have capacity
to measure radioactive xenon isotopes. In addition, 16 radionuclide
laboratories will support in the analysis of collected air samples.
Detection of radioxenon escaping from underground nuclear
explosions has been shown to be a very useful means to verify the
nuclear nature of an explosion detected by other technologies, for
instance using seismic sensors. Four of the most produced isotopes
in ﬁssion of uranium or plutonium are xenon isotopes with half-
lives long enough to make detection at long distances realistic.
These isotopes are 133Xe (T1/2¼ 5.25 d), 133mXe (T1/2¼ 2.2 d), 131mXe
(T1/2 ¼ 11.8 d), and 135Xe (T1/2 ¼ 9.14 h) (ENSDF, 2011).
After the ﬁrst announced DPRK test in 2006, 133Xe and 133mXe
released from the test was detected using a mobile measurementND license.
Fig. 1. IMS radionuclide monitoring stations closest to North Korea. Filled circles mark
stations with both particulate and radioxenon systems. Station RN37 is equipped only
with a particulate system. All radioxenon systems in the area were operating in
February 2013 except for the one at RN22 in China. The star marks the position of the
DPRK nuclear test site at Pungye-ri.
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increased levels of 133Xe measured at the IMS station in Yellow-
knife, Canada, were consistent with the leak scenarios assumed for
a low yield underground nuclear explosion on the Korean penin-
sula (Saey et al., 2007). After the second announced nuclear test in
2009, however, no radioxenon measured in the IMS could be
associated with the test.
At the time of the third test on February 12, 2013, all IMS radio-
nuclide stationswithin a distance of 2000 km from the test sitewere
operating. In the ﬁrst few weeks that followed, all radioxenon and
particulate detections in the area were found to be consistent with
normal background. In the case of radioxenon, this background
normally originates from nuclear power plants and isotope pro-
duction facilities. It was concluded that an initial (within a couple of
hours) xenon release from the test site, if any,must have been below
about 1011 Bq of 133Xe, corresponding to about 0.01% of the total
inventory of 133Xe present. This conclusionwas based on analysis of
measurements made at the IMS radioxenon station JPX38, which
according to atmospheric transport modeling was found to be sen-
sitive to a hypothetical initial release from the DPRK test site. The
upper source term limit was determined by ﬁtting the observations
to forward atmospheric transport models, using the hypothesis that
the measured xenon originated from the DPRK test site.
However, beginning on April 7, 2013, several samples containing
unusual combinations of 133Xe and 131mXe were collected at the
IMS stations RN38 at Takasaki, Japan, and RN58 at Ussuriysk,
Russia. The present paper presents a detailed analysis of these
observations, and investigates the possible connection of the de-
tections to releases of radioxenon created in the nuclear test con-
ducted in the DPRK, seven to eight weeks earlier.
The general principles for xenon detection are discussed in
Section 2. The activity concentration analysis of the collected
samples is described in Section 3. The uniqueness of the observa-
tions with respect to station history is discussed in Section 4, fol-
lowed by atmospheric transport modeling using both forward and
backward transport analysis in Section 5. A comparison of the
observed isotopic ratios to calculated production and release sce-
narios is given in Section 6, followed by a discussion of the results in
Section 7, ending with ﬁnal conclusions in Section 8.
2. General principles for radioxenon detection in the IMS
Automatic radioxenon collection and analysis systems of three
different types are installed in the IMS. In the area surrounding the
Korean peninsula (see Fig. 1), three Swedish SAUNA systems
(Ringbom et al., 2003) are installed at stations RN22 (Guangzhou,
China), RN38 (Takasaki, Japan) and RN77 (Wake Island, USA). The
Russian stations RN58 and RN60 are equipped with the Russian
system ARIX (Popov et al., 2005), and at RN20 in Beijing a French
SPALAX system (Fontaine et al., 2004) is installed. All xenon systems
except the one at RN22 were operating in February 2013. Following
maintenance, station RN22 came online again on February 21, 2013.
All three types of xenon systems work according to the same
main principle: collection of xenon in 12- or 24 h air samples fol-
lowed by preparative gas chromatography in several steps until a
pure xenon sample is transferred to a detector system using carrier
gas. The activity measurement is performed either with HPGe
gamma detectors (SPALAX) or scintillator beta-gamma coincidence
detectors (SAUNA and ARIX). The samples discussed in this report
were all measured using beta-gamma systems, which are particu-
larly sensitive to both 133Xe and 135Xe, as well as the metastable
xenon isotopes 131mXe and 133mXe. This detection technique is
based on detection of electrons from beta decay or internal con-
version using a plastic scintillator cylinder containing the gas
sample. The coincident gamma radiation or X-rays are detectedusing a NaI detector surrounding the electron detector (Reeder
et al., 1998; Ringbom et al., 2003). The different beta-, gamma-,
CE-, and X-ray decay modes result in characteristic distributions in
the two-dimensional electronephoton coincidence spectrum, and
allows for activity concentration analysis using observed net-count
rates in selected regions of interest together with the measured
collected air volume (Axelsson and Ringbom, 2003; De Geer, 2007).
Examples of high-statistics measurements of the two radioxenon
isotopes discussed in this report are found in Fig. 2. The main fea-
tures in the 133Xe spectrum are a beta continuum with 346 keV
endpoint energy detected in coincidence with 81 keV gamma-rays
or 32 keV Cs X-rays and 45 keV conversion electrons. The 131mXe
spectrum is dominated by a 129 keV conversion electron peak in
coincidence with 30 keV Xe X-rays. All regions of interest used in
the analysis are also indicated in Fig. 2.
Prior to each sample measurement a background measurement
is performed, to enable subtraction of the contribution from any
activity remaining from the previous sample. Furthermore, a long
(typically one week) ambient background measurement is recor-
ded when the system is installed. All three measurements are used
in the activity concentration calculation.
The beta-gamma detectors are calibrated with respect to energy
and efﬁciency using standard gamma ray point sources and radio-
active xenon samples. The gamma and electron energy calibration is
automatically monitored between each samplemeasurement using
a 137Cs check source. The beta energy calibration can thenbe veriﬁed
by investigation of the Compton scattering distribution in the
electronephoton coincidence spectrum (Reeder et al., 2004).
Due to the difﬁculty in obtaining calibrated low-level radioactive
xenon sources and associated logistics to perform frequent tests of
calibrations, the uncertainty in the measured isotopic ratios are esti-
mated from the comparisons between the initial calibrations per-
formed at the manufacturer and the check sources used on a daily
basis. The 1s uncertainties are generally estimated to be in the range
of10e30% formost radioxenonmeasurement systems (determined
from e.g. intercomparison experiments), though our analyzes lead us
to believe the isotopic ratios are likely more accurate than that.
3. Activity concentration analysis of collected samples
During the ﬁrst few weeks after the test on February 12, 2013,
only normal background levels were observed at the IMS stations.
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Fig. 2. High-statistics electronephoton coincidence spectra showing the main decay modes used in the analysis of radioxenon samples. The regions of interest (ROI) used in the
analysis are indicated as rectangular areas. A pure 133Xe spectrum is shown in the left panel, and a spectrum of 131mXe (with a small 133Xe component) is shown to the right. The
region of interest centered at 350-keV photon energy is used to subtract any radon present in the sample.
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preliminary analysis of a sample collected by the SAUNA system at
RN38 in Takasaki, Japan, on April 7, 2013, showed an unusually high
131mXe/133Xe ratio. This sample was followed by two similar sam-
ples collected at the same station, and on April 12 and 13, two
samples with even higher 131mXe/133Xe ratio were collected at
station RN58 in Ussuriysk, Russia. The three consecutive samples
collected at RN38 starting April 7 will be referred to as samples 1e3,
and the two consecutive samples collected at RN58 starting April
12 will be referred to as samples 4 and 5.
Gamma and beta energy spectra gated on 32 keV X-rays for the
ﬁve samples are shown in Fig. 3. Live-time corrected background
spectra recorded prior to each sample measurement are super-
imposed in red. The two peaks visible in the gamma spectra are the
32 keV X-ray peak from 133Xe and 131mXe and the 81 keV 133Xe
gamma peak (compare to Fig. 2). The beta spectra contain, with
varying statistics, the 131mXe 129 keV conversion electron peak
superimposed with the 133Xe beta continuum.
The electron energy resolution of sample 4 and 5, measured in
the ARIX detector at RN58, was lower compared to the RN38
measurements. Together with the weaker activity, this resulted in a
much smaller 129 keV peak. To give more conﬁdence to whether or
not 131mXe is detected at that station, sample 4 was compared to
another sample measured earlier by the same detector, at that time
containing the same amount of 133Xe as sample 4. As can be seen in
Fig. 4, the presence of 131mXe is visible more clearly when the
comparing the two samples.
The activity concentration analysis using the net counts algo-
rithm described above was performed using the software XECON
(Ringbom, 2009). Spectra from the ARIX detectors were analyzed
with a modiﬁed version that automatically corrects for energy
drifts. The photon- and electron energy scales were adjusted with
respect to the initial calibration using the quality control spectrum
collected between each sample and background measurement. For
the station RN38 the applied photon energy gain shifts were below
1%, and the beta gains were adjusted 2e8%. For station RN58 the
photon energy correction was 2e9%, and the electron energy
correction was 10% for one of the detectors. For the second beta
detector at RN58 the beta energy correction was as large as 64%.
One reason for the large energy corrections for this stationwas thatthe ARIX system was undergoing maintenance in the beginning of
February 2013, and only resumed operation just before the
announced nuclear test. After this maintenance, there was no time
to perform an accurate calibration, and an approximate calibration
was used. Since quality control spectra were recorded regularly and
automatically, it was still possible to correct for this shift in the
analysis. However, the process resulted in additional systematic
uncertainties that have to be taken into account when interpreting
the data (see below).
The resulting activity concentrations, referenced to the indi-
cated sample collection start times, of the ﬁve samples are reported
in Table 1. As can be seen, 133Xe and 131mXe are clearly detected in
all ﬁve samples. Except for a 135Xe activity concentration slightly
above the critical limit in sample 4, no other xenon isotopes were
detected. The reason for the 135Xe detection is most likely a slight
positive bias in the detector for this isotope (see Section 4.2).
Resulting 131mXe/133Xe activity ratios, referenced to the indi-
cated activity measurement start times, are shown in Table 2. Note
that activities rather than activity concentrations are used to
calculate the ratios. The reason is that reported activity concen-
trations are not “snap-shots” of concentration at well-deﬁned
times. They must be calculated from activities measured in sam-
ples collected during a ﬁnite sampling period, on the basis of some
assumption on the time variation of the actual concentration in
the sampled air during sample collection. The most common
assumption is that the activity concentrations of all nuclides were
constant during the entire sampling period. If the concentrations
during sampling actually varied on a time scale signiﬁcant
compared to the half-life of the nuclides involved, then a ratio of
reported activity concentrations will not be consistent with a ratio
of measured sample activities. Use of activities instead of con-
centrations to form ratios, on the other hand, avoids unnecessary
assumptions concerning the time variation of concentration dur-
ing sampling.
For samples 1e3, measured in Takasaki, the activity ratios are in
the range 0.1e0.2. The ratios observed at the Ussuriysk station are
higher (1.3 and 1.4, respectively). The uncertainties in the activity
ratios are calculated using Fiellers’s theorem (von Luxburg and
Franz, 2009) which provides an exact solution to the problem of
calculating the conﬁdence intervals of the ratio of two random
Fig. 3. Sample (white) and background (red) gamma and beta spectra from the ﬁve
radioxenon samples discussed in this report. Sample 1e3 are measured at station
RN38, and sample 4e5 at station RN58. The two peaks in the gamma spectra are the
32 keV X-ray peak from 133Xe and 131mXe and the 81 keV gamma peak from 133Xe. The
beta spectra consist of the 129 keV conversion electron peak from 131mXe on top of the
beta continuum from 133Xe with a maximum energy of 346 keV (best visible in sample
2). The black horizontal lines above parts of the spectra indicate the regions of interests
used in the analysis.
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important if one of the variables is close to zero, which is the case in
some of the samples discussed here. The uncertainties were
calculated assuming no correlation between 131mXe and 133Xemeasurements, which was found to be approximately true (see
Section 4.3).
4. Observations in relation to station measurement history
4.1. Activity concentration time series
Analysis of radioxenon data in the IMS (Hoffman et al., 2009)
and in dedicated background measurement campaigns (Saey et al.,
2012) have shown that the major sources for the measured global
radioxenon background appear are environmental releases from
isotope production facilities (IPFs) producing mostly 99Mo (99mTc)
and 131I. Another common radioxenon source are nuclear power
plants (Kalinowski and Tuma, 2009). None of the ﬁve major IPFs in
the world are located in the area, but nevertheless it is possible that
part of the normal radioxenon background observed at stations
RN38 and RN58 originates from these facilities, and/or from smaller
facilities located closer to the monitoring stations. Another source
of background is the operation of nuclear power plants in Japan and
South Korea. As calculated by Wotawa et al. (2010), the station
RN38 has a signiﬁcant background from reactor operations in the
region. It needs to be noted, however, that all nuclear power plants
in Japanwere shutdown after the big earthquake and the following
nuclear accident in Fukushima Daiichi in 2011, and only two re-
actors (Ohi 3 and 4) had resumed operations by the time the third
announced DPRK nuclear test happened (IAEA PRIS, 2013; the
Guardian, 2012).
Five years of station history for 133Xe and 131mXe measured at
RN38 in Takasaki, Japan is shown in Fig. 5. The RN38 data set consist
of 2820 12 h samples, collected from July 1, 2008 to May 18, 2013.
The time series shownwere ﬁltered to remove unreliable data with
small stable xenon volumes (<0.3 ml of xenon collected in a
12 h period by the SAUNA; less than 30% of the normal yield, and
therefore are subject to large systematic uncertainties). Further-
more, the Fukushima event caused very high concentrations in all
noble gas systems in the northern hemisphere (Bowyer et al., 2011;
Stohl, Seibert and Wotawa, 2012), and should be regarded as an
anomaly not related to normal background conditions, was also
removed from the time series for clarity. Finally, data were cor-
rected for energy drifts using check-source spectra.
The mean and 95th percentile activity concentrations for the
RN38 data series are given in Table 3. The isotope 133Xe is detected
in 60% of the samples, with an average activity concentration of
0.16 mBq/m3, and the 95-percentile activity concentration is
0.46 mBq/m3. Occasionally plumes with activity concentrations an
order of magnitude higher are detected. The 133Xe levels measured
in the samples from April 7 to 8 2013 (colored red in Fig. 5) are not
exceptional, and by itself this plume would not merit extra atten-
tion with respect to nuclear explosion monitoring. (For interpre-
tation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article.) The 131mXe measure-
ments, however, offer a different picture. This isotope is detected in
26% of the samples, with an average of 0.02 mBq/m3, and the 95th
percentile is 0.095 mBq/m3. The three consecutive samples
collected on April 7 and 8 are the 10th, 2nd and 3rd strongest
131mXe samples, respectively, ever collected at this station, and are
all within the 99th percentile. There is no other example of
consecutive samples above 0.2 mBq/m3 in the measurement his-
tory from this station. There is however one sample from June 4,
2009, which was measured to contain 0.6 mBq/m3 of 131mXe. This
sample was measured only a couple of weeks after the second
announced nuclear test in DPRK. However, neither atmospheric
transport modeling nor the observed 131mXe/133Xe ratio support
the conclusion that this samples was caused by radioxenon
released from the announced test on May 25, 2009. The source of
Fig. 4. Sample (white) and background (red) gamma and beta spectra collected by one of the detectors at RN58. The ﬁgure illustrates the difference between a sample containing
both 131mXe and 133Xe and a sample with only 133Xe at the same activity concentration level (0.20 mBq/m3). The upper sample is sample 4 in Table 1, and the lower sample was
collected on March 17, 2013. Note the relative intensity difference between the 32- and 81 keV photon peaks, and the presence of the 129 keV conversion electron peak in the upper
panel.
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tiﬁed. It is possible that this observation was caused by a nearby
source, such as a hospital or research institution.
The observations at station RN58 display a similar picture,
although the available station history is much shorter than that of
RN38, and the beta energy calibration of this station needed to be
corrected, as mentioned above. Fig. 6 shows data collected between
February 5 and May 18, 2013, in total 181 samples. Also in this case,
results based on stable xenon volumes below 0.3 ml were removed.
The energycalibrationwas adjustedusing the quality control spectra,
asdescribed in theprevious section. Theenergycalibrationwas foundTable 1
Measured activity concentrations (AC) and critical limits (Lc) for the ﬁve samples discus
133Xe 131mXe
Station Sample Coll. Start (UTC)
yyyy-mm-dd hh
AC (mBq/m3) Lc
(mBq/m3)
AC (mBq/m
RN38 1 2013-04-07 19 2.14  0.12 0.08 0.20  0.0
RN38 2 2013-04-08 07 3.05  0.14 0.09 0.57  0.1
RN38 3 2013-04-08 19 1.94  0.12 0.09 0.28  0.0
RN58 4 2013-04-12 12 0.21  0.05 0.07 0.24  0.0
RN58 5 2013-04-13 00 0.22  0.05 0.06 0.28  0.0to be stable during the entiremeasurement period,with variations at
the 1% level. As can be seen, the two samples subject to the present
analysis have the highest 131mXe concentrations in the data series.
Although the beta energy calibration had to be altered by as
much as 64% using by the calibration check source, to ﬁrst order the
activity concentrations were likely not largely affected by this
adjustment. The electron efﬁciency is close to 100% above the
low-energy threshold, and consequently the beta efﬁciency for
133Xe is mainly determined by this threshold. A positive energy
shift, as was the case for the largest adjustment, will slightly in-
crease the 133Xe electron efﬁciency, and the 131mXe electronsed in this report. Statistical uncertainties are at the 1s level.
133mXe 135Xe
3) Lc
(mBq/m3)
AC (mBq/m3) Lc
(mBq/m3)
AC (mBq/m3) Lc
(mBq/m3)
9 0.13 0.10  0.07 0.12 0.07  0.21 0.35
1 0.15 0.16  0.09 0.15 0.13  0.20 0.33
9 0.13 0.02  0.07 0.12 0.01  0.21 0.35
5 0.06 0.01  0.04 0.07 0.54  0.29 0.44
5 0.06 0.01  0.04 0.07 0.36  0.26 0.44
Table 2
Measured 131mXe/133Xe activity ratios for the ﬁve samples discussed in this report.
Statistical uncertainties are at the 1s level.
Station Sample Acq. Start (UTC)
yyyy-mm-dd hh
131mXe/133Xe
activity ratio
Interval
RN38 1 2013-04-08 14 0.10 þ 0.04  0.04 0.06e0.14
RN38 2 2013-04-09 02 0.19 þ0.04  0.04 0.16e0.23
RN38 3 2013-04-09 14 0.15 þ0.04  0.05 0.11e0.20
RN58 4 2013-04-13 04 1.27 þ 0.56  0.36 0.90e1.83
RN58 5 2013-04-13 16 1.37 þ 0.56  0.34 1.03e1.87
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slightly lower 131mXe/133Xe ratio. The hypothesis that the efﬁciency
stays approximately the same is supported by the fact that the
ratios observed in sample 4 and 5, recorded using different de-
tectors (one shifted 10%, and the other shifted 64%), are equal
within statistical uncertainties.4.2. Frequency distribution analysis
In order to further characterize the station history, and to
investigate the inﬂuence of any systematic biases in the activity
concentration analysis, frequency distributions of the observed
activities were constructed. The xenon frequency distributions for
RN38 are shown in Fig. 7. For a measurement series with no or
infrequent activity concentrations above the detection limit, the
frequency distribution will be dominated by spectral (i.e. non-
xenon) background results determined by the measurementFig. 5. 133Xe and 131mXe activity concentration time series for station RN38 in Takasaki, Japan
31 2011, affected by the large xenon release from the Fukushima accident was removed for
the three RN38 samples discussed in this report are colored red.
Table 3
Characteristic parameters for the measured xenon activity concentration data series at s
concentration (in mBq/m3), 95th percentile, sigma for ﬁtted log-normal (LN) or normal
Station 133Xe 131mXe
x P95 sLN m x P95 sLN m
RN38 0.16 0.46 0.87 0.11 0.023 0.095 0.85 0.017
RN58 0.075 0.22 0.75 0.059 0.014 0.088 1.61 0.0053capability of the system. The frequency distribution can then be
well described by a simple normal distribution
f ðxÞ ¼ 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2ps
p exp

 1
2s2
ðx mÞ2

(1)
with variance s and mean m. If there is systematic bias in the
analysis of the data from a station with no real detections, it will
then be reﬂected by a mean value different from zero. In cases of
measurement series with a signiﬁcant fraction of samples above
the detection limit, the frequency distributions were ﬁtted using a
2-parameter lognormal distribution, given by
f ðxÞ ¼ 1
xs
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2p
p exp

 1
2s2
ln
 x
m
2
; x;m; s > 0 (2)
where s is the shape parameter, and m is the scale parameter. The
parameterm is the true geometric mean of the distribution and also
equals the median. The log-normal distribution has been used for
decades to describe frequency distributions in the ﬁeld of dilution
of environmental pollutants (Ott, 1995). The lognormal distribu-
tions were folded with a detector response function, determined by
the observed uncertainty as a function of measured activity con-
centrations. This uncertainty function was found to be well
described by a square-root dependence.
The ﬁt results for RN38 are shown in Fig. 7 and Table 3, where the
133Xe and 131mXe frequency distributions were ﬁtted using the
function in Eq. (2), and the 133mXe and 135Xe distributions using the
function inEq.1. Generally, the distributions arewell describedby the, measured between July 1, 2008 and May 18, 2013. Data between March 13 and August
clarity. The time of the accident is indicated with the dashed vertical line. Results from
tation RN38 and RN58. From left to right for each isotope: mean measured activity
(N) distribution, and m for log-normal or mean (m) for ﬁtted normal distribution.
133mXe 135Xe
x P95 sN m x P95 sN m
0.0076 0.070 0.035 0.0072 0.018 0.48 0.24 0.014
0.0026 0.051 0.029 0.0037 0.031 0.56 0.38 0.017
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Fig. 6. 133Xe and 131mXe activity concentration time series for station RN58 in Ussuriysk, Russia, measured between February 5 and May 18, 2013. The two RN58 samples discussed
in this report are colored red.
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133Xe and 131mXe background inTakasaki. No systematic biases could
be found in the frequency distributions for this station, and this was
true alsowhen the studywas performed for each detector separately.)3AC (mBq/m
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Fig. 7. Frequency distributions for the four xenon isotopes for station RN38, measured bet
removed. The solid lines marks ﬁtted log-normal (133Xe and 131mXe) or normal (133mXe and
position of the three samples discussed in this report.The results for RN58 are almost similar, again noting that the
statistics are poorer for this station because of the shorter mea-
surement history. Also here, the 133Xe and 131mXe observations
indicate a random behavior. A negative bias for 135Xe of0.15 mBq/)3AC (mBq/m
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ween July 1, 2008 and March 18, 2013. Data affected by the Fukushima accident were
135Xe) distributions, and the arrows in the 133Xe- and 131mXe distributions marks the
Fig. 8. Two-dimensional 133Xe and 131mXe activity concentration plots for station RN38
in Takasaki, Japan. Since background subtraction is performed in the analysis, activity
concentrations can be negative. The top panel shows the complete historical record in
blue, the DPRK related observations in red, and the lone unusual ratio observation in
green. The bottom panel shows the post-Fukushima data for detector 1. Linear
regression was performed on both populations with the coefﬁcients and residual
variance given in the legend. The distance of the most unusual ratio to the historical
regression line was calculated at 6.11 s, placing this observation at the 99.999996
percentile.
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0.23mBq/m3 for the other, resulting in an increased number of false
135Xe detections by the latter detector. This is most likely the reason
for the reported 135Xe detection in sample 4.
4.3. Activity concentration correlations
In addition to frequency distribution analysis described in the
previous section it can be very illustrative to extend the analysis to
more than one dimension by creating distributions of activity
concentrations of two different isotopes in the same sample. In this
way correlation effects in the activity concentration analysis can be
identiﬁed. This is also a useful tool to quantify the uniqueness of
observations not visible in one dimension, since differences in ra-
tios and absolute concentrations are illustrated in the same plot of
the distribution.
A total of ﬁve sequential measurements at RN38 were identiﬁed
as being potentially related to a DPRK release when allowing for
decay and measurement uncertainties. In addition to samples 1e3
in Table 1, the two subsequent samples with collection start times
2012-04-09 at 7 and 19 UTC, respectively, were investigated. The
activity concentrations of the additional samples were 0.72  0.07
and 0.21  0.06 for 133Xe, and 0.01  0.05 and 0.04  0.05 for
131mXe, respectively. These ﬁve ratios were plotted in the context of
the overall monitoring history in the top panel of Fig. 8. The results
are quite striking with three of the ﬁve measurements (sample 1e
3) appearing as a distinct population from the historical monitoring
data. The other two data points fell within the central mass of the
historical population. In the entire historical record, there is only a
single measurement high in 131mXe (in chartreuse), occurring prior
to the Fukushima accident, measured on June 4, 2009 (see Section
4.1). Furthermore, the majority of observations that were high in
133Xe are from the time period prior to the Fukushima accident,
indicating the effect of the shutdown of many nuclear power plants
in Japan since then.
The data was further analyzed by investigating the more rele-
vant post-Fukushima time period. The bottom panel of Fig. 8 shows
the post-Fukushima measurements for the detector that measured
that largest 131mXe/133Xe ratio. Quantiﬁcation of the “unusualness”
of the ratios was performed by using Fieller’s theorem to combine
the uncertainties in 131mXe and 133Xe. Next, a total least squares
regression model was ﬁt to the historical population. The distance
in terms of 131mXe (the more unusual isotope) from the largest
131mXe/133Xe data point to the historical model was calculated to be
over 6s or approximately 99.999996 percentile.
5. Source localization and source term estimation from
atmospheric transport modeling
5.1. Method
Thegeographicpositionsofpossible sources andassociatedxenon
source terms were studied using both forward and backward
Lagrangian particle dispersion modeling in combination with global
windﬁelds. In the casewhere the release source location is unknown,
backward transport calculations can be used to identify possible
source regions for an assumed release time, and to calculate hypo-
thetical source strength. The basis for backward transport calcula-
tions is the sourceereceptor sensitivity (SRS) ﬁelds calculated for
each measurement (Becker et al., 2007; Wotawa et al., 2003). The
SRS-ﬁeld is obtained by backtracking of particles evenly released
during the sampling period of the station at the station location. The
SRS ﬁelds are stored as adjoint concentration ﬁelds, normally in 3h-
bins, and provide a sensitivity relationship between an activity
released at a certain place and time and the activity concentrationmeasured at the station. The SRS-ﬁelds can be used to construct so
called Fields-Of Regard (FOR) and Possible Source Regions (PSR). A
FOR shows the geographical area covered by ameasured sample for a
given time range preceding the measurement, excluding grid cells
with very small dilution factors yielding unrealistically high source
terms. A PSR is a correlationdistribution in space and time, indicating
howwell a given release position and timewould be able to explain a
combination of at least two measurements. A PSR is obtained by
calculating the correlation between the SRS ﬁelds and the vector of
observed concentrations for each geotemporal grid cell. The source
term for each grid cell is obtained by a linear ﬁt of the observed
concentrations to the SRS ﬁeld.
Regarding identiﬁcation of the PSR, we use two approaches
here. One is the original approach; using PSR ﬁelds that go back 7e
14 days in time, and taking into account the detections as well as
samples before and after. In the second approach, we only look at
the detections themselves, use SRS ﬁelds that go back only 2e3
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possible release locations that cannot explain all the detections, but
only a sub-set of those. This criterion will make the PSR smaller.
This smaller PSR is well illustrated using the measurements
discussed in this report. Fig. 9 shows PSR ﬁelds calculated using
samples 1e3 in Table 1 in combination with SRS ﬁelds calculated
using HYSPLIT (Draxler and Hess, 1998) in 3D particle mode with
GDAS weather data with 0.5 spatial resolution. The PSR to the left
is calculated using the traditional PSR method, while the right
ﬁgure shows the same PSR, with the added logical condition that
correlations are only calculated if all SRS-ﬁelds overlap in space and
time. As can be seen, the possible source region is considerably
smaller. Most of the correlations in China are removed, and the
region centered on the DPRK test site is smaller.
If a probable release location has been identiﬁed, forward at-
mospheric transport modeling can be used to study the response
from one or several measurement stations with respect to calcu-
lated hypothetical releases from the identiﬁed position. It is
important to remember that this technique does not exclude other
possible sources. The hypothesis should therefore be further sup-
ported by other relevant information. This will be further discussed
in Section 7.
5.2. Results from backward atmospheric transport modeling
Fig. 10 shows PSR ﬁelds calculated using the three samples
measured at station RN38 (samples 1e3). The PSR ﬁelds are
calculated by requiring overlapping SRS ﬁelds as described in the
previous section, and are presented for release times in
6 h intervals, between midnight April 6 and midnight April 8, 2013.
Correlations for release times on April 6 and 7 are obtained for two
main regions, one located at or around the DPRK test site, and the
other region more to the west, in China. At even earlier release
times, not shown in the ﬁgure, the latter region is spread out even
more to the west, and the region around DPRK moves to the north.
Corresponding results for the RN58 data (sample 4 and 5) are
shown in Fig. 11, this time for release times starting on April 12 in
the morning, and two days back in time. This analysis also indicates
that possible release locations include the DPRK test site for release
times only hours before collection stop in the ﬁrst RN58 sample. AtFig. 9. Possible source regions (PSR:s) for an assumed release time at 0600, April 7, 2013 (UTC
the two panels are calculated using the same measured data and weather data but according
of calculating PSR:s is used. The right panel shows the same PSR, with the additional requi
three samples.earlier release times, possible source regions are again found more
to the west.
It is evident that if the two detection series obtained in Japan
and Russia are to be explained by emissions of xenon from a single
location they must have been caused by at least two different re-
leases, separated by several days. By comparing Figs. 10 and 11 by
eye, and trying to identify regions with high correlations common
for both detection series, it is clear that this regionwill be located in
an area around the DPRK test site, and for earlier release times in an
area in China west of the test site.
It is possible to identify release regions which explain all mea-
surements by performing a PSR calculation using allﬁve samples, and
shift the collection time of one of the stations versus the other to
simulate a single release causing all the detections. Since the source
terms could be different for the two actual releases, the measured
activityconcentrationsmustbescaledwith thesource termsobtained
for the two separate releases before the correlation is calculated. For
example, the collection start of the ﬁrst RN58 sample can be assumed
to be the same as that of the ﬁrst RN38 sample, and by calculating the
PSRusing the RN58 SRSﬁelds fromApril 12 and 13, one can study the
hypothesis that all ﬁve detections were caused by a single release,
having the same time difference relative to the samples measured at
both stations. This means, for example, that if a high correlation is
found at a certain position in the combined PSR at a release time
24 h before collection start of the ﬁrst RN38 sample, this would
actually correspond to two releases from the same location, the other
one occurring 24 h before collection start of the ﬁrst RN58 sample.
A systematic studyusing this approachwasperformed, assuming
different time shifts between the RN38 and the RN58 samples. One
case is shown in Fig. 12, where the collection start of the ﬁrst RN58
sample is assumed to occur 12 h before the ﬁrst RN38 sample, cor-
responding to the situation that the second release reached RN58
12 h faster than the ﬁrst release reached RN38. As can be seen in the
ﬁgure, the release region explaining all observations is conﬁned to a
small area which includes the DPRK test site. The combined PSR is
considerably smaller than the ones obtained from the individual
stations, shown in Figs. 10 and 11. Transport time differences be-
tween 0 and 48 h were studied, and in all cases the only clearly
indicated release region was conﬁned to a small area including the
DPRK test site. At very early release times, correlations scattered in), using the 133Xe activity concentration results for samples 1e3 in Table 1. The PSR:s in
to two different approaches. The left panel shows the result when the traditional way
rement that correlations are only generated when all SRS-ﬁelds are overlapping for all
Fig. 10. Possible source regions calculated using the 133Xe activity concentration results for samples 1e3 in Table 1, measured at station RN38 in Takasaki, Japan. Date and time is the
assumed release time.
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in northern DPRK was the only one showing a consistent behavior
when release and transport time were varied.
As mentioned above, this method is new, and needs to be
further investigated with respect to associated uncertainties. The
very small PSR obtained when the ﬁve samples are combined
should at this stage not be over-interpreted. It might be that it is too
small compared to the overall uncertainties of the SRS ﬁelds and
themeasured activity concentrations, which not are included in the
calculation. Nevertheless, the results clearly indicate that if one
release location is assumed to explain the observations at both
stations, the most likely release area includes the DPRK nuclear test
site. Furthermore, the observations are difﬁcult to explain by re-
leases from nuclear facilities in Japan or South Korea.
In addition to the analysis discussed above, the traditional and
validated approach was used here as well, based on SRS ﬁelds
calculated with the FLEXPART model (Stohl et al., 2005) Version 8,fed with meteorological analysis data from the European Centre
for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) extracted with
the highest possible resolution (spectral truncation T1279
(z16 km), resampled to a 0.1 degree longitudeelatitude grid). The
scenario used for the PSR ﬁeld took into account RN38 samples 1e
3 in Table 1, together with one non-detection collected at RN38
just before sample 1, and two smaller detections at RN38 imme-
diately following sample 3 (with 133Xe activity concentrations 0.72
and 0.22 mBq/m3, respectively). In addition, seven non-detections
at RN58, collected between April 7 12:00 UTC and April 10,
midnight, were included. For the non-detections, a base value of
0.10 mBq/m3 was used for the correlation calculation. As can be
seen in Fig. 13, the max correlation ﬁeld well includes the DPRK
event location. It excludes other locations, like the Fukushima
Daiichi NPP location, and the location of the Japanese NPP Ohi, the
only nuclear power plant in operations in whole of Japan during
the time of interest.
Fig. 11. Possible source regions calculated using the 133Xe activity concentration results for sample 4 and 5 in Table 1, measured at station RN58 in Ussuriysk, Russia. Date and time is
the assumed release time.
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release would have to take place at the DPRK 2013 event location to
best explain thewholemeasurement scenario. This can be obtained
by interpolating the PSR ﬁeld (correlation) to the exact location of
the event, and to display a corresponding time series (see Fig. 14).
According to the analysis, the best correspondence would be ob-
tained for releases on 7 April 2013 around 00 UTC, and on 6 April
2013 between 0 and 6 UTC.
5.3. Results from forward atmospheric transport modeling
The results from the backward modeling presented in the previ-
ous section motivate performing forward atmospheric transport
modeling assuming releases from the DPRK test site. Release sce-
narios were calculated using HYSPLIT in forward 3D particle mode,
with GDAS 0.5 weather data. Continuous releases in 3-h back-to-back intervals were calculated for the period April 6e12 2013. Each
run followed 100,000 particles for 7 days. The result from each 3 h
release scenario was used to calculate hypothetical decay-corrected
activity concentration series measured at the stations. A linear com-
bination of the activity concentration series fn(t) was constructed as
f ðtÞ ¼ P
n
SnfnðtÞ, where Sn is the source term for each release sce-
nario. The function f(t)wasﬁtted to observed concentrationswithin a
speciﬁed time range using the least-square method. The ﬁt produces
source terms for each release scenario included. The method was
applied in an iterative manner, by ﬁrst including all non-zero sce-
narios in the given time range. All scenarios resulting in source
strengths below 1010 Bq were removed and the procedure was
repeated until only source terms above 1010 Bq remained.
The resulting ﬁt to 131mXe data fromRN38 is shown in Fig.15. It is
possible to ﬁnd a solution for f(t) that describes the observations
well. Thebestﬁtwas found for a combinationof two3-hour releases,
Fig. 12. Possible source regions calculated using all ﬁve samples in Table 1, measured at RN38 and RN58. The calculation assumes two different releases, and a source-to-station
transport time which is 12 hour shorter for the measurements at RN58.
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the morning (UTC), which is 12 local time. This is in good corre-
spondence with the results obtained from the backtracking (see
previous section). The resulting 131mXe source terms were
(7.1  2.6)  1011 and (6.9  1.1)  1011 Bq, respectively. The proce-
durewas repeated forRN58data, and the results are shown inFig.16.
The scenario giving the best correspondence to the observations at
this station was a single 3-hour release starting at 9 in the morning
on April 12. This means that if the detections at the Russian station
are caused by a release from the DPRK nuclear test site, they must
have been caused by a release occurring a later time than the release
causing the detections in Japan. The calculations are in best agree-
mentwith the secondRN58 sample (sample 5 inTable 1). The 131mXe
source termwas (7.6  1.2)  1011 Bq, i.e., very similar to the source
terms obtained from the detections made by RN38.
6. Source term and activity ratio calculations from nuclear
data
The development of the isotopic composition of radioxenon as a
function of time and place following an underground nuclear ex-
plosion can become very complex, depending on where and when
the various ﬁssion products are separated from each other.
Furthermore, in principle, this process can occur in several steps
before any xenon is released into the atmosphere through ﬁssures
and fractures in the ground, air pressure venting or through some
other process, such as human intervention. An important quantity
in the fractionation process is the amount of iodine that accom-
panies the xenon in each step, since additional xenon is produced
by beta-decay of iodine after the explosion.Calculations of produced radioxenon activities and activity ra-
tios released from nuclear explosions were performed starting with
fast-ﬁssion scenarios obtained from JEFF-3.1.2 (Koning et al., 2013)
or ENDF/B-VII.1 nuclear data (Chadwick et al., 2011). The ﬁssion
yields are given for a single neutron energy (400 keV for JEFF and
500 keV for ENDF/B data). Decay-chains were calculated using the
entire ﬁssion inventory until the separation time, after which only
xenon and a speciﬁed fraction of iodinewere assumed to contribute
to the chains. It should be noted that the uncertainties in the cal-
culations might be quite large due to large uncertainties in some of
the ﬁssion cross sections or branching ratios describing the decay.
As an example, the 131mXe/133Xe ratio could vary by a factor of two
depending on which of the two data libraries that was used.
Calculated 131mXe/133Xe ratios using JEFF-3.1.2 for two release
scenarios that were found to give good agreement to the observa-
tions within expected uncertainties are shown in Fig. 17. The sce-
narios were calculated for both 235U and 239Pu nuclear fuel. In one
release scenario, xenon is assumed to be fully contained with all
other ﬁssion products until release; in the other scenario, xenon is
assumed to separatewith 10% of the iodine 24 h after the explosion.
The former scenario was found to best ﬁt the observations at RN58,
having the higher ratios, while the 24 h separation scenario agreed
best with ratios observed at RN38, observed a few days earlier.
The IMS stations in Takasaki and Ussuriysk are also equipped
with particulate stations with the capability to measure particulate
iodine. Both stations were running in April 2013, and no iodine de-
tections were recorded during this time period. The minimum
detectable concentrations for 131I were around 5 and 3.5 mBq/m3 for
JPX38 and RUX58, respectively. According to the forward atmo-
spheric transport calculations described in Section 5.3, this would
Fig. 13. Possible source regions (correlation maxima) calculated using the extended scenario described in Section 5.2,. The point “DPRK13” denotes the DPRK event location,
“FUKU1” the location of the Fukushima Daiichi NPP, and “OINPP” the location of the NPP Ohi, the only NPP in operations in Japan during the time of the DPRK event in 2013.
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at the DPRK test site on April 6 or 7. This corresponds to a fraction of
105e104 of the iodine remaining after 7 weeks assuming no
fractionation until release following a 10 kt nuclear explosion, and
also assuming that all iodine would reach the station as particles.Fig. 14. Results of the correlation analysis using the extended scenario described in Section
what date/time a release would best explain the measured scenario.With so many unknowns, it is difﬁcult to draw any quantitative
conclusions regarding compatibilitywith the calculated scenarios in
Fig. 17.
It should also be noted that the predicted calculated ratio dif-
ference between cases using uranium and cases using plutonium as5.2, interpolated to the position of the DPRK 2013 event location. The plot indicates at
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Fig. 15. HYSPLIT Forward atmospheric transport calculations from the DPRK test site ﬁtted to observed 131mXe activity concentrations at station RN38 (upper panel). The lower
panel show the resulting source terms as function of release time.
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certainties. This makes it in this case difﬁcult to obtain additional
information on ﬁssile material used.
Corresponding absolute activities (given as Bq/kt) expected to
be produced in the four cases are presented in Fig. 18. The results
predict that approximately 1013e1014 Bq (varying with scenario) of
131mXe should remain in the cavity after 7 weeks for a 10 kt ex-
plosion, assuming that nothing escaped at earlier times.
7. Discussion
The activity concentration levels of 131mXe and 133Xe measured
at stations RN38 and RN58 are clearly above the detection limit in
all ﬁve samples. Even though statistics are poorer for the mea-
surement at RN58, a comparison with corresponding samples re-
ported to contain only 133Xe at the same level show that the
presence of 131mXe is very likely also at this station. The quality
control spectra collected between each measurement show that
the calibration is stable between the measurements. This was true
also for the Russian station, although the beta energy scale shows
a considerable shift compared to the associated station calibration
for one of the detectors. Because of the calibration problems
present at the Russian system, one can expect relatively large
systematic efﬁciency uncertainties for this station, which in turncan affect the observed ratios. According to the study of the fre-
quency distributions performed in Section 4.2 no systematic bias
could be found for the 131mXe and 133Xe measurements, giving
conﬁdence to the results. Another such factor, discussed in Section
4.1, is the fact that the measured ratios for the two detectors in the
Russian system were similar. It is however still possible that the
ratios could be systematically shifted. Using experience from many
years of operation with beta-gamma detectors, a very conservative
estimate would be that this difference should be no larger than
50% for the observed ratios from RN58. Even with this large sys-
tematic uncertainty taken into account, the observations are
unique, and still compatible with the ﬁssion scenarios discussed in
Section 6.
The unique 131mXe and 133Xe detections occurwithin ﬁve days of
each other at two different stations, which make a common cause
of the observations likely. The observed ratios agree well with what
is expected if the xenonwas produced in the nuclear test conducted
by DPRK on February 12, 2013. The fact that observations were
made at two different stations improves the source localization
considerably. Under the assumption that the observations are
caused by a release from a single location, many local sources can
be excluded, including facilities in Japan, South Korea, Russia, and
China. The atmospheric transport models conﬁne the possible
source region to a relatively small area which includes the DPRK
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for four different nuclear explosion scenarios (compare to Fig. 17).
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Fig. 19. Development of surface pressure (PMSL) at the DPRK 2013 event location based on ECMWF analysis data. The ﬁgure at the top shows the air pressure time series during the
14 days around the time period of interest, the ﬁgure at the bottom the variation since the announced nuclear test.
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include only grid-cells with non-zero SRS elements for all samples.
There are no other known nuclear facilities in this area that could
produce this signature. The calculated source terms agrees broadly
with a 1e10% release of the total inventory remaining in the cavity
expected from a 10 kt explosion, depending on the assumed frac-
tionation scenario.
The atmospheric transport modeling does not completely rule
out the possibility that the detections were caused by a release in a
region in northern China. To the authors’ knowledge, there is only
one nuclear facility in this area, the China Experimental Fast
Reactor (CEFR) in Beijing. No reports of running history or releases
during 2013 could be found for this facility; however, if a release
occurred in April 2013 at CEFR, it is likely that radioxenon would
have been detected by the IMS station RN20 in Beijing. This station
reported normal background during April 2013.
A possibility that part of the xenon signals were caused by local
sources still remains, though we have not identiﬁed any possible
sources of xenon isotopes in the region, despite numerous inquiries.
In addition, the fact that the series of 131mXe/133Xe ratiosmeasuredat
each station are all consistent with the same valuewithin error bars
makes it likely that the samples are not signiﬁcantly affected by
other sources. Furthermore, during 2013no 133Xe observation above
0.4 mBq/m3 was observed at RN38 in Japan. If one assumes a 133Xe
background contribution of 0.4 mBq/m3 for samples 1e3, the
131mXe/133Xe ratio increases 30% at the most (for sample 3). This
would not change any of our main conclusions.The consistent and coherent picture obtained from these facts
supports the conclusion that the detections are likely caused by
releases of radioxenon created in the nuclear test conducted by
DPRK on February 12, 2013.
It is clear that the two detection series observed in Japan and
Russia must have been caused by two different releases. Even if
large systematic uncertainties are taken into account, different
fractionation history may be required to explain the different
131mXe/133Xe ratios observed in Japan and Russia, respectively. As
mentioned above, the fractionation can become quite complicated,
and it is not unreasonable that two different noble gas releases
from a nuclear test could result in different radioxenon ratios. In the
case studied here, it appears that the xenon observed in Japan was
separated from its precursors earlier than the xenon observed in
Russia. One possible, but of course speculative, explanation for this
could be that the radioxenon in the tunnel system where the test
was conducted is not homogenous, and that the releases were
caused by human intervention in the tunnel, causing a ﬁrst release
of ﬁssion gases from the outer part on April 6 and/or 7. This xenon
could have been separated from other ﬁssion products at earlier
times compared to the xenon that was observed in Russia, which
could come from locations deeper inside the tunnel and released
ﬁve or six days later, on April 12.
Though little is known about relevant conditions at the North
Korean test site, in principle the process of noble gas release would
have been aided, or could even have been caused by, especially low
ambient atmospheric pressure. As can be seen in Fig.19, ambient air
A. Ringbom et al. / Journal of Environmental Radioactivity 128 (2014) 47e63 63pressure was very low around the DPRK event location on April 7
around 0 UTC, one of the likely release times according to ATM.
8. Conclusions
Observed activity concentrations and ratios of the radioxenon
isotopes 133Xe and 131mXe collected at the IMS stations RN38 and
RN58 on April 7e8, and April 12e13, respectively, are unique with
respect to the stations history. Comparisons of data with calculated
isotopic ratios as well as analysis using atmospheric transport
modeling, partly performed with a newmethod, make it likely that
the measured xenon was created in the nuclear test conducted by
DPRK on February 12, 2013. More than one release was required to
explain all observations. The 131mXe source terms were calculated
to 7x1011 Bq for each release, corresponding to 1e10% of the total
xenon inventory for a 10 kt explosion. The observed ratios could not
be used to obtain any information regarding which ﬁssile material
that was used in the test.
The results illustrate the high capability of the IMS noble gas
network to detect multiple signals from nuclear explosions. They
show that the network has the capability to detect noble gas re-
leases from a nuclear test conducted more than seven week prior,
given favorable atmospheric conditions. Until now, scenarios and
analysis techniques discussed in connection to nuclear explosion
monitoring with IMS has been focused on early noble gas releases,
implying detection of 133Xe, 133mXe, and 135Xe. The isotope 131mXe
has often been considered irrelevant in applications for nuclear
explosion detection. The measurement discussed in this report
provides a completely new picture and further motivates the need
for sensitive measurements of metastable xenon isotopes for CTBT
applications.
The analysis presented here is also a reminder of the informa-
tion gained when releases are detected at more than one station.
The size of the possible source region was in this case greatly
reduced, and in particular, many local sources could be excluded
from the discussion. This illustrates the importance of a high station
density in the IMS.
Finally, the observations highlight the need to further investi-
gate the release mechanism that can cause releases several weeks,
or months, after a nuclear test. Such mechanisms have implications
for the On-Site Inspection regime, which also is a part of the CTBT
veriﬁcation system.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and
not necessarily represents the views of the CTBTO Preparatory
Commission.
References
Axelsson, A., Ringbom, A., 2003. Xenon Air Activity Concentration Analysis from
Coincidence Data. Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm, Sweden. FOI-
Re0913eSE.
Becker, A., Wotawa, G., De Geer, L.-E., Seibert, P., Draxler, R., Sloan, C., D’Amours, R.,
Hort, M., Glaab, H., Heinrich, P., Grillon, Y., Shershakov, V., Katayama, K.,
Zhang, Y., Stewart, P., Hirtl, M., Jean, M., Chen, P., 2007. Global backtracking of
anthropogenic radionuclides by means of a receptor oriented ensemble
dispersion modelling system in support of nuclear-test-ban treaty veriﬁcation.
Atm. Environ. 41, 4520e4534.
Bowyer, T.W., Biegalski, S.R., Cooper, M., Eslinger, P.W., Haas, D., 2011. Elevated
radioxenon detected remotely following the Fukushima nuclear accident.
J. Environ. Radioact. 102, 681e687.
Chadwick, M.B., Herman, M., Oblozinsky, P., Dunn, M.E., Danon, Y., Kahler, A.C., 2011.
ENDF/B-VII.1 nuclear data for science and technology: cross sections, covariances,
ﬁssion product yields and decay data. Nuclear Data Sheets 112, 2887e2996.CTBTO, 2013. Update on CTBTO ﬁndings related to the announced nuclear test by
North Korea. http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2013/update-on-
ctbto-ﬁndings-related-to-the-announced-nuclear-test-by-north-korea/.
De Geer, L.-E., 2007. The Xenon NCC Method Revisited. Swedish Defence Research
Agency, Stockholm, Sweden. FOI-Re2350eSE.
Draxler, R.R., Hess, G.D., 1998. An overview of the HYSPLIT 4 modeling system of
trajectories, dispersion, and deposition. Aust. Meteor. Mag. 47, 295e308.
ENSDF, 2011. National Nuclear Data Center, Evaluated Nuclear Structure Data File.
http://www.nndc.bnl.gov/ensdf/.
Fontaine, J.-P., Pointurier, F., Blanchard, X., Taffary, T., 2004. Atmospheric xenon
radioactive isotope monitoring. J. Environ. Rad. 72, 129e135.
Hoffman, I., Ungar, K., Bean, M., Yi, J., Servranckx, R., Zaganescu, C., Ek, N.,
Blanchard, X., Le Petit, G., Brachet, G., Achim, P., Taffary, T., 2009. Changes in
radioxenon observations in Canada and Europe during medical isotope pro-
duction facility shut down in 2008. J. Radioanal. Nucl. Chem. 282, 767e772.
Hui, Z., 2007. Revisiting North Korea’s nuclear test. China Security 3 (3), 119e130.
IAEA Power Reactor Information System (PRIS), 2013. http://www.iaea.org/pris/.
Kalinowski, M.B., Tuma, M.P., 2009. Global radioxeon emission inventory based on
nuclear power reactor reports. J. Environ. Radioact., 58e70.
Koning, A., Dean, C., Fisher, U., Mills, R., 2013. Validation of the JEFF-3.1 Nuclear Data
Library. OECD, Issy-les-Moulineaux, France.
Murphy, J.R., Stevens, J.L., Kohl, B.S., Benett, T.J., Barker, B.W., 2011. Supplemental
analysis of the seismic characteristics of the 2006 and 2009 North Korean
nuclear tests. In: Proceeedings of the 2011 Monitoring Research Review:
Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies. NNSA, Tucson,
Arizona, pp. 513e523.
NORSAR, February 12, 2013. Nuclear explosion in North Korea. http://www.norsar.
no/norsar/about-us/News/NuclearExplosionDPRK12Feb2013.
Ott, W.R., 1995. Environmental Statistics and Data Analysis. Lewis Publishers, Boca
Raton, FL.
Popov, Yu.S., Prelovskii, V., Donets, A.Y., Kazarinov, N., Popov, V., Mishurinskii, V.,
Dubasov, Y., Rykov, Y., Skirda, N., 2005. The ARIX automatic facility for
measuring concentrations of radioactive xenon isotopes in the atmosphere.
Instr. Exp. Techn. 48, 373e379.
Reeder, P.L., Bowyer, T.W., Perkins, W., 1998. Beta-gamma counting system for Xe
ﬁssion products. J. Radioanal. Chem. 235, 89.
Reeder, P.L., Bowyer, T.W., McIntyre, J.I., Pitts, W.K., Ringbom, A., Johansson, C., 2004.
Gain calibration of a beta-gamma coincidence spectrometer for automated
radioxenon analysis. Nucl. Instr. Meth. Phys. Res. A521, 586e599.
Ringbom, A., 2009. XECON radioxenon analysis software. http://sourceforge.net/
projects/xecon.
Ringbom, A., Elmgren, K., Lindh, K., Peterson, J., Bowyer, T., Hayes, J., McIntyre, J.,
Panisko, M., Williams, R., 2009. Measurements of radioxenon in ground level air
in South Korea following the claimed nuclear test in North Korea on October 9,
2006. J. Radioanal. Nucl. Chem. 282, 773e779.
Ringbom, A., Larson, T., Axelsson, A., Elmgren, K., Johansson, C., 2003. SAUNA e a
system for automatic sampling, processing, and analysis of radioactive xenon.
Nucl. Instr. Meth. Phys. Res A508, 542e553.
Saey, P.R.J., Bean, M., Becker, A., Coyne, J., d’Amours, R., De Geer, L.-E., Houghe, R.,
Stocki, T., Ungar, R.K., Wotawa, G., 2007. A long distance measurement of radio-
xenon in Yellowknife, Canada, in late October 2006. Geoph. Res. Lett. 34, L20802.
Saey, P.R.J., Ringbom, A., Bowyer, T., Zähringer, M., Auer, M., Faanhof, A.,
Labuschagne, C., Al-Rashidi, M., Tippawan, U., Verboomen, B., 2012. Worldwide
measurements of radioxenon background near isotope production facilities, a
nuclear power plant and at remote sites: the “EU/JA-II” project. J. Radioanal.
Nucl. Chem..
Stohl, A., Forster, A., Seibert, P., Wotawa, och G., 2005. Technical note: the Lan-
grangian particle dispersion model FLEXPART version 6.2. Atmos. Chem. Phys. 5,
2461e2474.
Stohl, A., Seibert, P., Wotawa, G., 2012. The total release of xenon-133 from the
Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant accident. J. Environ. Radioact. 112,
155e159.
The Guardian. 1 July 2012. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/01/japan-
protest-nuclear-plant-reopens.
USGS, 2013. http://comcat.cr.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eventpage/usc000f5t0#summary.
von Luxburg, U., Franz, V.H., 2009. A geometric approach to conﬁdence sets for ratios:
Fieller’s theorem, generalizations, and bootstrap. Statistica Sinica, 1095e1117.
Wotawa, G., Becker, A., Kalinowski, M., Saey, P., Tuma, M., Zähringer, M., 2010.
Computation and analysis of the global distribution of the radioxenon isotope
Xe-133 based on emissions from nuclear power plants and radioisotope pro-
duction facilities and its relevance for the veriﬁcation of the nuclear test ban
treaty. Pure Appl. Geophys. 167, 541e557.
Wotawa, G., De Geer, L.-E., Denier, P., Kalinowski, M., Toivonen, H., D’Amours, R.,
Desiato, F., Issartel, J.-P., Langer, M., Seibert, P., Franck, A., Sloan, C.,
Yamazawa, H., 2003. Atmospheric transport modelling in support of CTBT
veriﬁcation - overview and basic concepts. Atm. Environ. 37, 2529e2537.
